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White-Collar Crime: An Empirical 
Typology of White-Collar Criminals in a 
National Sample
Jan Ketil Arnulf and Petter Gottschalk
BI Norwegian Business School
Abstract. This study explores a nationally representative sample of 222 Norwegian white-collar
criminals in terms of the roles they and their victims had in their crimes. Establishing a typology
framework based on agency models, we point out the most frequent types of white-collar criminals
and their most profitable types of actions. Victims of white-collar crimes are mostly participants in
business transactions. As expected, top executives are a predominant group of white-collar criminals
and their most frequent victims are owners. However, another type of white-collar criminal coined
“entrepreneur criminal” turns out to be more frequent and making bigger profits in absolute and
relative terms. These work within smaller, less established companies with less transparent
governance and target a broad range of victims. Our data support the view that white-collar crime is
based on competence, not deviant dispositions, and poses real but to some extent foreseeable risks
to business strategies. Theoretical and practical implications are discussed.
Keywords: white-collar crime, top executives, agency theory, entrepreneurship.
1.   Introduction
“Standard economic models treat individuals as playing a game with fixed rules
which they obey. They do not buy more than they can pay for, they do not
embezzle funds, and they do not rob banks.” In his seminal paper on agency
theory and transaction costs, Williamson   (1981, p. 31) called for the need to take
"human nature as we know it" into account, addressing the fact that human agents
are subject to bounded rationality and opportunism. But when it came to take the
real human propensity for crime into account, even Williamson seemed to restrict
his analysis to “moral hazard”, which is hardly criminal but only legally
opportunistic. 
Assessing and understanding risk is of special relevance in strategy, but even
people who address this fact rarely if at all pay special attention to white-collar
crime as a risk factor (Eisenhardt, 1989; Helmer, 2003; Taleb, 2004). We believe
this represents a knowledge gap in strategy learning, given the following facts:
The 2011 PricewaterhouseCoopers global economic crime survey
(PriceWaterhouseCoopers, 2011) documents that white-collar crime is a
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persistent and intractable problem, affecting more than 50% of US companies in
the past two years. The crimes suffered span asset misappropriation, accounting
fraud, intellectual property infringement, corruption and bribery and money
laundering. Schnatterly (2003) claimed that the cost of white-collar crime may be
as high as 6 percent of annual sales, and Rosoff, Pontell, & Tillman (2004) found
that the cost of white-collar crime is about 14 times that of ”traditional” crimes
targeting private persons and households. Clearly, strategic decision makers are
well advised to be aware of crime as a risk to business and not count on the
opportunism of contract partners to be restricted by rules. Organizations may
suffer from white- collar crime in at least three ways: Through fraudulent
behavior by external contract partners, by internal individuals securing profits for
themselves at the cost of the shareholders and, less obviously, by engaging in
business transactions that may turn out as illegal, risking legal reactions and loss
of reputation. As an example of the latter type, Laffey & Laffey (2010) show how
participants in the US gambling business used gaps in regulations to target new
markets, but the risk of prosecution shaped the strategic behaviors not only of
service providers but also third parties such as underwriters, consultants and
banks.
Despite the fact that opportunism in business transactions provides very real
incentives and rationales to commit crime, the management literature has had a
tendency to draw artificial lines between “agency theory”, “white collar crime”
and “business ethics”. Legal knowledge itself is not a sufficient basis to assess the
risk of business partners engaging in white-collar crime. As shown by recent
contributions of neurobiology (Hirstein & Sifferd, 2011) and the role of fines in
explaining criminal intentions (Rousseau & Telle, 2010), people don’t label their
own actions as “committing crimes”, but seek to employ their understanding of
business where the risk of being fined is just one of many imperfect regulations
of business conduct. Literature on business development has seldom addressed
white-collar crime and the noteworthy exceptions that do exist have shown that
traditional, theoretically founded governance mechanisms are imperfect
(Schnatterly, 2003) or may actually sometimes increase the likelihood that
managers engage in crime (Bilimoria, 1995; Donoher, Reed, & Storrud-Barnes,
2007; Klima, 2012). Most of the existing research examines whether particular
governance practices have effect on particular hazards and crimes. Not even the
recent encyclopedia on white-collar crime contains a description of the
connection between roles in governance and their respective risks of engaging in
criminal behavior towards their contractual partners (Salinger, 2005). To our
knowledge, no-one has made a unified approach to white-collar crime as a
business area defined by the behavioral roles of perpetrators and victims, which
is strange given the vast amount of research on how different types of governance
lend themselves to informational asymmetry and secrecy. Moreover, business
organizations and networks lend themselves easily as the kind of contexts that
give rise to organized crime (Edwards & Levi, 2008). Closer scrutiny also shows
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that business transactions are time-sensitive in their vulnerability towards crime
(Klima, 2012). In fact, a classical debate in the theory of white-collar crime is
whether this concept is anti-business biased or reflecting a true issue of hidden
risk in business – the Sutherland-Tappan debate (Holtfreter, 2005).
Our aim is to look at the total known population of white-collar criminals
within one legal environment (i.e., one nation) in terms of business organization
and governance and ask the research question: Under which type of agency model
is white-collar crime most frequent and most profitable: as principals, as agents,
as entrepreneurs, as single professionals or as non-organized perpetrators of white
collar crime, and who are their most likely victims?
2.   Theory
Sutherland coined the term “white-collar crime” in a lecture in 1939 (Sutherland,
1940) to draw attention to the fact that members of the privileged socioeconomic
classes also commit crime. Since then, researchers have discussed what might be
included in and what might be excluded from this concept and the discussion is
summarized by scholars such as Benson and Simpson (2009), Blickle et al.
(2006), Bookman (2008), Brightman (2009), Bucy et al. (2008), Eicher (2009),
Garoupa (2007), Hansen (2009), Heath (2008), Kempa (2010), McKay et al.
(2010), Pickett and Pickett (2002), Podgor (2007), Robson (2010), Schnatterly
(2003) and even in encyclopedic form (Gerber & Jensen, 2006; Salinger, 2005).
Even though stories of contemporary famous examples – recently, such people as
Bernard Madoff, Raj Rajaratnam or Jeffrey K. Skilling – may be relevant and
interesting case studies, the extent of generalization from such case studies is
questionable and the study of white-collar crime has not been treated
systematically in a strategic risk perspective. A larger sample of white-collar
criminals is needed to study average values as well as variation in white-collar
characteristics. 
A crime is an act determined by law as criminal, and normally grouped
according to the legal paragraphs describing them. One of the challenges of
prosecutors and lawyers is to argue for the case that any given instance of an act
may qualify as a crime or not. Because of this, categories of crimes have an
abstract quality that seldom describes the causes and dynamics involved in the
actual behaviour.
Different theories of white-collar crime focus on different mechanisms
driving criminal behaviour. Central to these theories are concepts such as
opportunity, trust and (core) competence. These are central concepts of doing
business in organizations. White-collar crime is, to rephrase Clausewitz (1968,
orig. 1832), “the continuation of business with other means.” How have previous
theories conceptualized white-collar crime, and do these have implications for
business?
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Naylor (2003) formulated a general theory of profit-driven crime and
proposed a typology that shifts the focus from actors to actions by distinguishing
between market crime, predatory crime, and commercial crime. The theory of
profit-driven crime suggests that financial crimes are opportunity driven, where
executives and managers identify opportunities for illegal gain. Opportunity is a
flexible characteristic of financial crime and varies depending on the type of
criminals involved (Michel, 2008).  Viewing organized crime as organized
business, a framework relevant to risk in strategy may be used to analyze the
criminals and their acts: What is the role of the criminal when engaging in the
crime, and who is the victim?
2.1. Characteristics of White-Collar Criminals
According to Brightman (2009), Sutherland's theory of white-collar crime from
1939 was controversial since many of the academicians in the audience perceived
themselves to be members of the upper echelon of American society. Sutherland
defined white-collar criminal as a person of respectability and high social status
who commits crime in the course of his occupation, excluding cases of murder,
adultery, and intoxication, since these are not customarily a part of these people’s
occupations (Benson & Simpson, 2009). But it also excludes lower class
criminals committing financial crime, as pointed out by Brightman (2009). In
today's business world, business managers and executives are the individuals with
power and influence associated with respectability and high social status. 
The concept of the “white-collar criminal” has come under some attack in
recent years and we will only briefly refer some main points to delineate our focus
group. Brightman (2009) argues that the term white-collar crime should be
broader in scope and include virtually any non-violent act committed for financial
gain, regardless of one's social status. Bookman (2008) regards Sutherland's
definition as too restrictive and suggest that white-collar crime is an illegal act
committed by nonphysical means and by concealment or guile, to obtain money
or property, to avoid payment or loss of money or property, or to obtain business
or personal advantage. Pickett and Pickett (2002) use the terms financial crime,
white-collar crime, and fraud interchangeably. They define white-collar crime as
the use of deception for illegal gain, normally involving breach of trust, and some
concealment of the true nature of the activities.
It is likely that fewer white-collar criminals are put on trial than “ordinary”
street criminals, and even fewer upper class criminals are sentenced to
imprisonment, even though the sentences are increasingly draconic for those who
actually are prosecuted (Dhami, 2007; Holtfreter, 2008). 
Even though the distinctions between “ordinary” crime, financial crime and
the core of Sutherland’s original concept of “white-collar criminals” have been
blurred in recent years, closer examination of this population shows that there is
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still a subset of high status offenders without previous criminal records who were
valued and trusted by surrounding stakeholders (Weisburd & Waring, 2001).
Podgor (2007) pointed out that the most interesting aspect of Sutherland's work
is that a scholar needed to proclaim that crimes of the "upper socioeconomic
class" were in fact crimes that should be prosecuted. Tappan, one of the strongest
opponents of Sutherland, claimed that the whole approach was “anti-business
biased” (Holtfreter, 2005). It is apparent that prior to the coining of the term
"white collar crime," wealth and power allowed some persons to escape not only
criminal liability, but also suspicion, which is a major element in the abuse of
trust. In our view, the best reason to keep the term “white collar crime” is that it
calls attention to the criminal potential of a group of people otherwise above
suspicion for reasons of status, power or trust, even though they may have even
stronger opportunities and incentives to act opportunistically than others.
We choose in our definition to follow Hansen (2009), who claims that white-
collar crime can be defined in terms of the offense, the offender or both.  Defined
in terms of the offense, it means a crime against property committed by non-
physical means and by concealment or deception for personal or organizational
gain. Defined in terms of the offender, it means crime committed for personal or
organizational gain by individuals who are wealthy, highly educated, and socially
connected, and who are typically employed by and in legitimate organizations.
2.2.  Typology of white-collar criminals and principal-agent theory
As long as criminal behavior on the part of contractual partners is treated as
unfortunate exceptions to the rule, white-collar crime is in the realm of
“uncertainty” rather than “risk” in the sense of strategy (Helmer, 2003). Both
from a scientific and a business perspective, “risk” implies some level of
knowledge that allows more precise measurement and assessment of the
vulnerability of organizations to white-collar crime. Our purpose here is to
develop and test another way of classifying white-collar criminals, building on
principal-agent theory and assigning roles to perpetrators depending on their roles
in business transactions and the organization of the work implied by the criminal
act. 
Principal-agent theory holds that owners (principals) have different interests
from administrators (agents), such that principals must always suspect agents of
making decisions that benefit themselves, to the cost of the principals. In short,
CEOs may always be suspected of cheating the owners, and appropriate measures
of checks and governance need to be in place (Chrisman, Chua, Kellermanns, &
Chang, 2007; Eisenhardt, 1989; Williamson, 1981). Since controls invoke costs,
principal-agent theory is also related to transaction-cost theory and the value of
trust (Teece, 2010; Williamson, 1985). This theoretical framework has been
influential in economics, management and strategy for decades (Baiman, 1990).
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Even more recent alternatives such as knowledge creation theory (Nahapiet &
Ghoshal, 1998) acknowledge the need for governance to provide the necessary
trust and transparency to create knowledge that has competitive advantage
(Arnulf, Dreyer, & Grenness, 2005; Lane & Lubatkin, 1998). In this way, we also
believe the governance issues involved in principal-agent theory apply to risks of
crime involved in entrepreneurship. Using the definition of Shane &
Venkataraman (2000, p. 218), the study of entrepreneurship involves “the study
of sources of opportunities; the processes of discovery, evaluation, and
exploitation of opportunities; and the set of individuals who discover, evaluate,
and exploit them”. The sources of opportunities and their exploitation as well as
the individuals must be assumed also to include criminally opportunistic
behaviors, and we include the concept “entrepreneurship” as a category of
exploiting business opportunities in ways that reduces transparency, thus
facilitating white-collar crime in business transactions (Gottschalk, 2009).
On this basis, we built a framework identifying six roles of white-collar
criminals, engaging in five types of interactions with their victims:
1. “Principal criminals”: Principal-agent theory may be applied in
several different settings. Technically, owners are principals but
merely owning a share does not imply criminal behaviors. Activity
will have to be on the part of board members (owners or representing
the owners). We have restricted the model such that “principals” are
chairmen or members of the board and “agents” are CEOs or similar
top executives of organizations. 
2. “Agent criminals”: In our case, white-collar criminals are coded
“principals” if they committed a crime in the role of chairmen or board
members and “agents” if committing crime as top executives (the
same people may have other roles that were not affected by the crime
in question).
3. “Entrepreneur criminal”: The third category stems from the fact that
the principal-agent distinction is not always applicable in practice.
Many of the white-collar criminals in our database are founders,
owners, chairmen and/or CEOs in a mix of roles and often their
companies are all but paper constructions. This solitary role may also
be similar to a tight family ownership constellation with different
challenges in governance and agency (Chrisman, et al., 2007; O'Boyle
Jr, Pollack, & Rutherford, 2012) White collar criminals who are
themselves sole owners/chairmen/CEOs of a company that partly or
entirely engage in unlawful activities to make revenues are labeled
“entrepreneur criminals”. “Entreprenership” may also be seen as an
alternative choice in organizing business, using creative methods in
novel ways to create bigger returns than more established ways of
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organizing similar work (Minniti & Lévesque, 2010; Scott Shane &
Venkataraman, 2000), and research shows that the answer to the
question of “why, when and how different modes of action are used to
exploit entrepreneurial opportunities” (Scott Shane & Venkataraman,
2000, p. 218) is sometimes based on criminal intent (Gottschalk,
2009).
4. “Servant criminal”: This role is assigned to a person who does not
hold a formal leadership position in the business transaction, but who
is central in a crime because of special professional knowledge that
may be exploited, either in isolation or as part of a bigger crime.
Examples are computer programmers who help writing code that help
evading taxes, accountants with special access to books and registers
or auditing consultants that help inflate assets by forged certificates.
Servant criminals may be on the inside or outside of the main
organization in the crime (raising again the question of the boundaries
of an organization), but act as hired consultants and in that way act as
parts of an organization. 
5. “Public official”: These are people who are usually performing the
role of impartial third party regulators such as police, politicians or
municipal authorities. Only officials in these roles are assigned to this
category, as executives and professionals in publically held companies
are grouped in previous categories.
6. “Robber criminal”: The final category of white-collar criminals is a
residual, consisting of individuals acting as private persons without a
defined business relation to the victim(s). This may be a private
person hacking bank accounts or receiving social security support
through fraud.
These types of white-collar criminals may be found to relate to the following
five types of victims:
A. “Cheating investors”: When viewing white-collar crimes as organized
activities, the victims may be grouped in terms of the relationship they
have to the organization. Starting with principal-agent theory, the
unfaithful agent will be cheating the principals, i.e., owners or
investors. Any criminal who has tried to steal profits from investors
has been labeled “cheating investors”.
B. “Cheating customers”: Conversely, profits may be increased for
principals and agents alike by cheating the customers external to the
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organization. All criminals are labeled such if their unlawful behavior
involved cheating customers.
C. “Tax fraud”: Unlawful attempts at taking money from public finances
are labeled “tax fraud”. The category spans from tax evasion to
illegally obtaining public funding.
D. “Bribes”: This category is reserved for criminal acts where any kind of
rule by bribing third party regulators.
E. “Cheating innocents”: Taking money from people who are not aware
of having entered a business relationship with the perpetrator in
question.
We will now attempt to use this classification to explore its value in
understanding and measuring the criminal behaviors displayed in the present
sample.
3.   Research Method
In a small country like Norway with a population of only five million people,
there are limits to available sample size. One available option would be to study
court cases involving white-collar criminals. A challenge here would be to
identify relevant laws and sentences that cover our definition not only of white-
collar crime, but also required characteristics of white-collar criminals. Another
available option is to study newspaper articles, where the journalists already have
conducted some kind of selection of upper class, white-collar individuals
convicted in court because of financial crime. Another advantage of this approach
is that the cases are publicly known, which makes it more acceptable to identify
cases by individual white-collar names. Therefore, the latter option was chosen in
this research. 
Our sample has the following characteristics as applied by newspapers when
presenting news: famous individuals, famous companies, surprising stories,
important events, substantial consequences, matters of principles and significant
public interest. This is in line with research by Schnatterly (2003) who searched
the Wall Street Journal for several years in her study of white-collar crime
published in the Strategic Management Journal. It also avoids the Sutherland-
Tappan debate since the criminals have been “carefully selected by sieving of the
due process of law” as we include only criminals convicted of legal crimes, no
misdemeanors (Holtfreter, 2005, p. 777). 
There are two main financial newspapers in Norway, “Dagens Næringsliv”
and “Finansavisen”. In addition, the newspaper “Aftenposten” regularly brings
news on white-collar criminals. These three newspapers were studied on a daily
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basis from late 2009 to late 2011 to identify white-collar criminals. A total of 222
white-collar criminals were identified during those two years. A person was
defined as a white-collar criminal if the person seemed to satisfy general criteria
mentioned above, and if the person was sentenced in court to imprisonment. 
For this study it was considered sufficient that the person was sentenced in
one court, even if the person represented a recent case that still had appeals
pending for higher courts. A sentence was defined as jail sentence. Therefore,
cases which resulted in a fine rather than a custodial sentence were not included
in the sample. As our research is based on newspaper articles written by
journalists, the reliability and completeness of such a source might be questioned.
However, most cases were presented in several newspapers over several days,
weeks or even months, enabling this research to correct for initial errors by
journalists. Furthermore, court documents were obtained whenever there was
doubt about the reliability of newspaper reports. This happened in one-third of
reported cases. 
It must be noted that there are, of course, disadvantages of applying
newspapers as data source. According to Burns and Orrick (2002), research
suggests that the media present a distorted image of crime by focusing on violent,
sensational events that are atypical of crime in society. They argue that the media
is neglecting coverage of corporate offenses, and that the media
disproportionately focus on conventional crime while neglecting the impact of
corporate misbehavior. This line of reasoning, however, can be seen as an
argument for our research design, where the white-collar crime cases stand out in
the media.
3.1.  Sample Characteristics
As suggested in the research literature, most white-collar criminals are men. This
is confirmed in our sample of 222 persons, which includes only 18 (8%) female
criminals and 204 (92%) male criminals. The youngest was 21 years and the
oldest 75 years old. A distinction is made between age when convicted and age
when committing crime. On average, a person was convicted 5 years after the
crime, thus the average age when committing crime is 43 years old since the
average age when convicted was 48 years old.
Anecdotal cases such as Madoff, Rajaratnam and Skilling portray men in
their fifties or older. This fits our sample as the average age is 48 years at the time
of conviction, in agreement with a study by Blickle et al. (2006) of 76 convicted
German white-collar criminals where 8% were female and the mean age was 47
years. This is also similar to the findings of the consulting firm KPMG (2011),
stating that the typical fraudster is a 36 to 45 years old male  commiting fraud
against his own employer, works in the finance function or in a finance-related
role, holds a senior management position, employed by the company for more
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than 10 years, and works in collusion with another perpetrator. These
characteristics are based on 348 actual fraud investigations conducted by KPMG
member firms in 69 countries.
All persons in our sample received a jail sentence for white-collar crime. The
average jail sentence was 2.2 years, with a maximum of 10 years and a minimum
of 15 days. The longest jail sentence of 10 years was given to a person involved
in bank fraud convicted of organized crime. In a Norwegian context these jail
sentences are quite substantial, only passed by organized crime and murder (the
sample of Blickle et al. (2006) received 3.9 years imprisonment in Germany).
In the Norwegian court system, there are three levels: district courts, courts of
appeal and Supreme Court. Out of 222 cases, 122 were decided final in district
courts, 89 were decided final in courts of appeal, while 11 cases were decided
final in Supreme Court. 
The average amount involved in each financial crime case by white-collar
criminals was 64 million Norwegian kroner or on average 10 million US dollars.
The smallest crime amount was 1 million, and the largest was 1200 million kroner
(about 198 million USD).
Only 36 white-collar criminals operated single-handed, the rest involved
others in their crimes. On average, 8 persons were involved in the white-collar
crime cases studied here. The maximum number involved in a case was 200
persons, where an accounting firm had been fixing 200 taxi owners’ accounts so
that they paid less tax. Only four persons from this taxi fraud scandal were
included in our sample as white-collar criminals: the accounting responsible, the
computer programmer, and two head taxi owners. 
In terms of the type of crimes, there were four main financial crime categories
by white-collar offenders: fraud, theft, manipulation, and corruption. Fraud can be
defined as intentional perversion of truth for the purpose of inducing another in
reliance upon it to part with some valuable thing belonging to him or to surrender
a legal right (Henning, 2009). Theft can be defined as the illegal taking of another
person’s, group’s or organization’s property without victim’s consent (Hill,
2008). Manipulation can be defined as a means of gaining illegal control or
influence over others’ activities, means and results such as tax evasion (Malkawi
& Haloush, 2008). Corruption can be defined as the giving, requesting, receiving
or accepting of an improper advantage related to a position, office or assignment
(Kayrak, 2008). Our sample spans 120 cases of fraud, 11 cases of theft, 51 cases
of manipulation, and 40 cases of corruption.
Income figures for all taxable incomes are published annually by Norwegian
tax authorities. Almost all 222 white-collar criminals were found on the list for
2009. The average personal income was 327 000 kroner (approximately 54 000
US dollars), tax was 532 000 kroner (approximately 88 000 US dollars), and
personal fortune was 37 million kroner (about 6 million US dollars). 
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The average white-collar offender worked in an organization with revenues
of 223 million kroner and 138 employees. 200 criminals worked in private sector
organizations, while 22 criminals worked in public sector organizations. 
The financial damage of 64 million Norwegian kroner (10.6 million US
dollars) was in most cases occurring outside the organization where the criminal
worked. The victim of crime was typically another organization: 180 criminals
caused damage to another organization or outside individual, while only 42
caused financial damage to his or her own organization.
Journalists in the media investigated and revealed a total of 59 out of 222
white-collar criminals. This represents 26 percent, which means more than one
fourth. However, there is a bias in our sample towards media, since only cases
presented in the media are included. Nevertheless, it may seem surprising that
journalists make such a significant contribution. After journalists we find victims
of crime who revealed 42 criminals (19%), followed by bankruptcy lawyers (8%),
tax authorities (8%), banks (7%), internal controls (6%), auditors (4%), the police
(4%), stock exchange (2%), and others (16%). While it may seem surprising that
journalists detect as many as 26 %, it may seem surprising as well that victims
were detecting as few as 19% and the police only 4%.
A distinction can be made between leader and follower in crime (Bucy, et al.,
2008). In our sample of 222 criminals we find 120 leaders and 102 followers.
While corporate crime is mainly for the benefit of the organization,
occupational crime is mainly for the benefit of the individual (Hansen, 2009) . In
our 222 cases we find 75 corporate criminals and 147 occupational criminals.
4.   Research Results
According to the official Norwegian statistics on employment, the share of all
kinds of managers in the total population is about 5.9%, and the share of CEOs
within this population is about 8%, or 0.5% of the population. In contrast, an
overwhelming majority of people convicted of white-collar crime cite their
current position to be CEOs or other top managers (43%) when appearing in
court, see figure 1. In fact, when all individuals in a top management position are
grouped (board, CEO, owner/founders), they amount to 45%, 28% being middle
managers, and only 16% are professionals with no management duties. 
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Table 1: Main role in crime by types of offenders
We then ran our analyses by using our own typology of criminals as described
above, see table 2. We tested our typology of criminal individuals by running
logistic regressions, using types of crimes and victims as dependent variables.
Our categorization of perpetrators turned out to allow significant predictions of
types of crimes (p for all regression equations < .05) except for tax evasion, which
is common to all as “the common cold of white collar crime”. Table 2 shows that
the CEOs are twice as likely to engage in crimes as their principals. As predicted
by principal-agent theory, they are more likely to cheat their principals (investors)
than customers or innocents. However, the most typical role of a white-collar
criminal by far is the entrepreneur criminal. These are also engaged in all types of
crimes, seen from the position of the victims.
The “servant criminals” are more likely to appear as accomplices to
entrepreneurs or CEOs than on their own. It is thus obvious that most white-collar
crimes are committed in organized ways, organizing also the criminals, often
spanning company boundaries in the same way that other businesses are
networked.
Who are the victims of white-collar crime? All white-collar criminals are
about equally likely to engage in tax frauds, but apart from this, investors are the
most likely victims. Every third white-collar criminal is convicted of cheating
investors in some way, and this is by far the most common crime for CEOs and
board members. 
Entrepreneur criminals are also cheating investors but more inclined to cheat
customers. It is obvious that entrepreneur criminals operate their companies in
ways that maximize their returns by reducing the value created for their
Formal position at trial Number   %
Chairman/Board member 16 7,2
CEO 36 16,2
Owner/Founder 48 21,6
Middle manager 24 10,8
Accounting/finance professional 15 6,8
Other internal professional 23 10,4
External consultant (e.g. investment advisor) 30 13,5
Lawyer 5 2,3
Public official 8 3,6
Unemployed 17 7,7
Total 222 100
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customers. Hired CEOs do not seem to be as likely to cheat their customers in this
way.
Table 2: Main role in crime by types of victims
Note: Percentages are relative to the whole sample.
Almost only the rest category “robber criminals” cheat innocent bystanders.
All other white-collar criminals prey on parties with whom they are engaged in
business. The “0” in the field of public officials on bribes implies even though
they have received bribes is that these are seen to cheat their principals, and
bribing is an offence committed by the briber.
Table 3: Leaders and followers in crime by the role in the crime
Table 3 shows that CEOs to an overwhelming degree take their roles into the
crime, being the main perpetrator and enlisting others as accomplices. Board
members are actually almost as likely to be followers as leaders. A small majority
of entrepreneur criminals are also leaders, but in fact a large share of the
“entrepreneurial criminals” in the sample have established or used their
companies to cover up crimes of others.
Role in crime Count % of all Cheating 
investors
Cheating 
customers
Tax 
fraud
Cheating 
innocents
Bribes
Principal criminal 14 6,3 % 4,1 % 0,9 % 2,7 % 0,0 % 0,5 %
Agent criminal 26 11,8 % 6,3 % 2,3 % 4,5 % 0,5 % 0,5 %
Entrepreneur criminal 84 38,0 % 9,5 % 14,0 % 19,9 % 1,4 % 5,9 %
Servant criminal 55 24,9 % 9,0 % 6,3 % 6,3 % 0,9 % 4,5 %
Public official criminal 9 4,1 % 0,5 % 0,0 % 1,4 % 0,0 % 0,0 %
Robber criminal 33 14,9 % 1,4 % 0,0 % 2,7 % 10,0 % 0,0 %
221 100,0 % 30,8 % 23,5 % 37,5 % 12,8 % 11,4 %
Leader/follower
Leader Follower
Crime role Count % Count %
Principal criminal 8 57,1 % 6 42,9 %
Agent criminal 21 80,8 % 5 19,2 %
Entrepreneur criminal 48 57,1 % 36 42,9 %
Servant criminal 24 43,6 % 31 56,4 %
Public official criminal 4 44,4 % 5 55,6 %
Robber criminal 12 36,4 % 21 63,6 %
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Table 4 shows the revenues of white-collar crime as a function of the
perpetrators’ roles and employing companies. It seems again as if the
entrepreneur criminals are cashing in the biggest amounts. When CEOs commit
crimes, they will more often do this in bigger companies than is the case for
principals. Servant criminals will more often be engaged in crimes involving huge
sums of money, but most often in the role of accomplices (followers), not as
leaders in crime. Public officials and the occasional robbers are only receiving
small money in this context.
99.5 % of all Norwegian companies have less than 100 employees. It is worth
noting that pure CEOs among the criminals typically work for the biggest
companies in the country. Board members and particularly entrepreneur
criminals, however, seem to commit their crime in small to middle-sized
companies. The interesting fact is that this is where the really profitable crime
seems to take place. The white-collar criminal as a leader makes most money as
entrepreneur, controlling most transactions in small companies, whereas
followers/accomplices seem to be moving in the bigger companies. 
Table 4: Crime roles by company size and leader/follower position in crime
Figure 1 shows the personal income, wealth and taxes paid for each type of
white-collar criminal. Entrepreneurial criminals are making the biggest profits
from crime, while having the lowest income and wealth and paying virtually no
taxes. 
Finally, figure 2 shows the relationship between official personal income and
crime profits. It can be seen that the entrepreneurial criminals make the best
profits, compared to their official income. The only group that comes close to
these is the robber criminals. In fact, these two groups are the only white-collar
Leader or follower in crime
Leader Follower
Company 
revenue 
(millons of 
NOK)
Company 
staff 
(headcount)
Crime 
amount 
(1000 
NOK)
Company 
revenue 
(millons of 
NOK)
Company 
staff 
(headcount)
Crime 
amount 
(1000 
NOK)
Principal criminal 102 42 42 370 179 36
Agent criminal 445 206 40 483 403 10
Entrepreneur 
criminal
170 60 114 110 39 14
Servant criminal 205 121 46 433 375 163
Public official 
criminal
825 775 6 162 201 2
Robber criminal 5 3 58 3 3 1
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criminals that make profits that exceed their recorded assets. Measured in terms
of registered assets, board members and top managers are making themselves
criminal for profits that are only fractions of their wealth. The entrepreneur
criminals are significantly boosting their capital basis. 
Figure 1: Income, taxes, wealth and amount involved in crime by the individuals’ role in the crime.
Note: All amounts in normalized figures to allow comparisons
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Figure 2: Net criminal profit after subtracting income. Normalized figures used to allow
comparisons.
5.   Discussion
The purpose of this study was to explore a role typology of white-collar criminals
based on agency models and explore which roles will commit white-collar crime
most frequent and most profitable as business venture, thus posing the biggest risk
to their victims: As principals, as agents, as entrepreneurs, as single professionals
or as non-organized perpetrators of white collar crime?
To achieve this, we went beyond legal labels of criminal acts and created an
analytical matrix based on the role of perpetrators in executing the crime along
one axis and the types of victims along the other axis. Our dataset consisted of all
known cases of white-collar crime in Norway reported during 2009-2011, a total
of 222 individuals. The sample spanned most types of crimes and professions
ranging from unemployed hackers of innocent people’s bank accounts to high-
profiled executives setting up Ponzi schemes.
A central finding was that most white-collar crime is committed within
business transactions by executives or professionals, targeting other parts of
business contracts as victims. There are also examples of “innocent bystanders”
Journal of Strategic Management Education 8(3)                                                                                     17
getting hurt, but these are exceptions. White-collar crime is obviously an
imminent possibility in all usual business transactions, regardless of role.
As predicted by classical agency theory (Eisenhardt, 1989; Williamson,
1981), one of the most frequent titles of a white-collar criminal in our sample is
a chief executive engaged in fraudulent behavior towards his or her principals.
However, when using our analytical framework of categorizing white-collar
criminals, a more differentiated picture emerges. The executives fitting the
classical role of the opportunistic agent are predominantly from big companies
and the amounts they unrightfully channel into their own pockets are relatively
small compared to their own wealth and incomes. 
Much higher profits – particularly if compared to the individual’s official
income – are made by a group of white-collar criminals that we label
“entrepreneur criminals”. These are people who use companies and legal subjects
as instrumental means to unlawfully maximize their profits by not behaving as
foreseen by contracts.
While the term “entrepreneur” remains controversial and difficult to define
precisely (Carland, Hoy, Boulton, & Carland, 1984; S. Shane, Nicolaoum,
Cherkas, & Spector, 2010; Scott Shane & Venkataraman, 2000; Sorenson &
Stuart, 2008), central features are quick business growth, scarcity of resources,
agile management and an innovative business model. The innovation does not
need to be radical (Minniti & Lévesque, 2010), as long as it creates a competitive
advantage against other actors in the same market. From our data it is fairly clear
that this “innovative” aspect may be exploited in criminal ways by two
mechanisms: 1) the competitive advantage may partly or even wholly imply
illegal conduct, securing gains that would not be possible for law-abiding
competitors, and 2) the relative lack of transparency typical of small companies
and tight family-like networks is more difficult to target by formal or informal
governance attempts and other crime prevention measures (Donoher, et al., 2007;
Holtfreter, 2008; Levi & Maguire, 2004; Schnatterly, 2003). As a strategic
choice, some entrepreneurs may take advantage of different types of legislation
or avoid going public to avoid transparency as in the case of the US gambling
industry (Laffey & Laffey 2010), but less transparency seems associated with
higher risk of exposure to white-collar crime (Klima, 2012). 
Neither free professionals nor top executives in big companies seem to be
able to make the same kinds of profits that these “entrepreneur criminals” make,
and even board members when convicted of crimes are likely to be involved in
some kind of relationship to an “entrepreneur criminal” by some kind of network.
It is also worth noticing that the “entrepreneur criminal” does not seem to have
victims of a preferred type. Instead, these kinds of criminals seem to use the kind
of opportunity recognizing capabilities characteristic of entrepreneurs (Baron &
Ensley, 2006; Krueger, Reilly, & Carsrud, 2000; S. Shane, et al., 2010; Scott
Shane & Venkataraman, 2000; Short, Ketchen, Shook, & Ireland, 2010) to tap
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any emerging field of business transactions, probably being in front of regulators,
law enforcing agencies and even alert business partners. 
As any other entrepreneur, our “entrepreneur criminals” display a skewed
distribution in profits, where most of them are small actors in a larger context.
However, they make sizeable profits within their own business, and there are also
extremely profitable cases here, replicating patterns of risky investments as
described by e.g. Taleb (2004). It testifies to the skills of these people that their
listed income and wealth is far below that of the “regular” CEOs and individual
professionals. A sizeable proportion of these people drives luxury cars and yachts
and inhabits several houses but their official income is at the level of the
unemployed ‘robber’ criminals in our residual category. In this way, they hardly
pay any taxes and their assets are difficult to reach even after court verdicts. Shane
& Venkatamaran (2000, p. 219) claim that “the absence of entrepreneurship”
from management theory would make “our understanding of the business
landscape incomplete,” and we would add that the entrepreneur as white-collar
criminal completes the picture. It seems obvious that their crimes are not
primarily due to sociopathic traits as portrayed by some criminologists (Alalehto,
2003; DeLisi, 2009; Knecht, 2006) or a fear of losing (Listwan, Piquero, & Van
Voorhis, 2010; Piquero, 2012), but rather by “the cognitive properties necessary
to value” opportunity (S. Shane, et al., 2010, p. 222) where their victims are
handicapped not only by asymmetric information, but also by incompatible
mental models (Helmer, 2003).
This leads to our main reasons for proposing this model of roles in white-
collar crime as a mental model for considering crime as a risk in strategy. Mere
knowledge about law itself renders little practical advise for the assessment of
who, in what contexts, are liable to engage in criminal acts. Basing our framework
instead on agency theory and research on entrepreneurship, we believe that the
model satisfies most of the five requirements Helmer (2003, p. 109) posits that an
effective mental model in strategy must possess: 1) Relevance, in so far as it
concerns the central roles in business – that of principals, agents, entrepreneurs,
professionals and customers, 2) Valid, since our data analysis shows that the
sample of white-collar criminals is correctly grouped according to chi-square
testing, 3) Complete in the sense that there is no rest category of unexplained
cases, 4) Simple, as this is a table with only six categories of criminal roles and
five roles of victims, and 5) Practical, since the model opens for more accurate
measurements and judgments of criminal behavior, allowing uncertainty to be
turned into risk and thereby possibly assessed. 
There should be at least two practical implications from our findings: First,
anyone entering uncertainties of business transactions needs to be aware that
highly competent and organized activities are at large, not only in the zones of
“incomplete contracting” or moral hazard, but even where clear contracts exist.
Entrepreneur criminals can make any transaction a target of white collar crime
and agents do seem to find ways of avoiding governance and transparency.
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Second, we believe that global analyses of whole samples of white-collar
criminals should be studied more often to provide society, lawmakers and
business executives with clear trends and typologies to keep the public updated
on white-collar crime.
6.   Limitations
Although we propose a classification of the roles of white-collar criminals in
business transactions, we have only tried to fit the model on our sample. We have
no evidence of the predictive value of our framework. Further, this study is based
entirely on publically available sources (newspaper and official tax registers) on
white-collar crime in one single country, i.e., Norway. We have collected this
information and classified roles and behaviors based on our own reading of the
reports published in the media. Distributions and dynamics may of course vary
across different legal and financial business contexts. Another limitation stems
from the eternal challenge in criminology, i.e., we are only able to describe
discovered and convicted cases, but this could also be interpreted as being
restrictive with regards to the including criteria as argued by Tappan in his
criticism of Sutherland (Holtfreter, 2005). All available research suggests that
this is only a fraction of the real numbers. There is however no reason to assume
that the undiscovered white-collar criminals are less skilled and high-profiled in
business.
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